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Abstract 
This research examines gatekeepers’ categorization work to assess and sort audience members. 
Using a multi-sited ethnography and interpretivist qualitative lens, we explore how high-value 
art gallerists sort buyers via categories, but also encourage conformity with preferred audience 
categories, both for artistic consecration goals and to discourage disruptive speculation. 
Categories served as reference points, with preferred and problematic buyer categories providing 
a discursive socialization tool, but also informing gatekeeping strategies, for example, 
problematic behaviors and buyer categories led to value-protecting gatekeeping and exclusion, 
often justified in moral terms. Monitoring continued throughout the relationship, with decisions 
considered both fair and necessary for gallerists’ professional practice. Gatekeeping decisions 
included long-term temporal considerations, prompting strategies including ‘placement,’ 
monitoring and audience recategorization. This extends gatekeeping beyond simply passing 
muster at the ‘gate.’ We also illustrate the dynamic and fluid nature of hidden categories, which 
provide gatekeepers with heightened abilities to punish perceived wrongdoing. 
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We only sell to people that we know and trust. If it is a seminal piece in an artist’s 
oeuvre, then we only sell to certain trusted people… We do encourage new 
collectors, but at the same time it is difficult, as we need to trust them. We sell to 
people who will come to us before selling to anyone else (Contemporary art 
gallerist, London, quoted in Davis thesis, 2005). 
Organizational researchers frequently turn to social categories to understand markets, fields, and 
complex areas of social life (Bowker & Star, 1999; Vergne & Wry, 2014; Hannan, et al., 2019). 
Therein, numerous articles examine how audiences rely on categories to evaluate organizations, 
often with a focus on intermediary assessments of organizations and products (e.g. Durand & 
Paolella, 2013; Pontikes & Barnett, 2015; Durand & Khaire, 2017), such as the value, boundaries 
and legitimacy of artistic movements and producers (DiMaggio, 1987; Khaire & Wadhwani, 
2010; Jones, et al., 2012; Cattani, et al., 2013). Rarely, however, do researchers pivot to explore 
how categories are deployed to sort through audiences. If categories shape the interface between 
organizations, intermediaries and audiences (Vergne & Wry, 2014; Kornberger, et al., 2015), and 
are important for audience attention (Glynn & Navis, 2013), we argue audience selection can 
also have distinct implications for perceived product quality, valuation, firm reputation and 
market function. For example, nightclub bouncers decide who passes the velvet rope (Rivera, 
2010), consulting firms exclude particular clients (O'Mahoney, et al., 2013) and only some 
buyers are authorized to purchase human tissues (Anteby, 2010). Examining these 
undertheorized discretionary assessments can enrich existing work on the impacts of visible 
versus hidden categories (Washington & Ventresca, 2004). We direct the social categories 
literature toward professional practices in audience categorization, including hidden gatekeeping 
by key market intermediaries. 
Gatekeeping is defined as the selection of who is ‘in’ or ‘out,’ assessing who is worthy to 
pass through a ‘gate’ (Lewin, 1947: 145). Audience members who pass muster are afforded 
access while those deemed unworthy are not. Gatekeeping typically features in creative 
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industries research (Long Lingo & O'Mahony, 2010; Foster, et al., 2011), but is useful for 
understanding categorization work performed by all sorts of intermediaries. We highlight 
gatekeeping as a complementary microfoundation of categories and categorization processes, 
adding to the growing, if limited, research at the intersection of social categories, intermediary 
audience assessments, and category boundaries in organization theory (Durand & Thornton, 
2018). 
In this paper we bring together two disparate research themes, one exploring how 
intermediaries use categories to maintain clear social boundaries versus allowing ambiguity 
(Pontikes, 2012; Durand & Paolella, 2013; Pontikes & Barnett, 2015) and another focusing on 
gatekeepers’ professional practices (Anteby, 2010; Rivera, 2010, 2015; Gustafsson, et al., 2018). 
First, building on an understanding that audiences are heterogenous (Durand & Thornton, 2018), 
we consider the implications for categorical boundaries in reducing ambiguity. Second, as 
exemplified in the opening quote, gatekeepers may need to consider moral issues in professional 
practice (Anteby, 2010), echoing Durkheim’s (1953) view of morality as a ‘system of rules for 
conduct’ unique to a given context. Here, professional practices of gatekeeping can be exercised 
on particular audience members to bring order and stability to the market (Bystryn, 1989; Rivera, 
2010), including the enforcement of market expectations to suppress disruptive buyers (Ody-
Brasier & Vermeulen, 2014). Such gatekeeping is especially important in markets with high 
uncertainty (Peterson, 1997; Podolny & Hsu, 2003; Foster, et al., 2011), where identifying 
trusted buyers, avoiding speculators, and stabilizing long-term valuation is paramount. Despite 
arguments that the deployment of intermediaries’ professional assessments, and moral judgments 
in particular, are fundamental for sorting audiences (Anteby, 2010; Rivera, 2010; Gustafsson, et 
al., 2018), the ways in which these assessments can shape categories and their boundaries 
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continue to receive scant attention. Consequently, we ask: How do gatekeepers sort audience 
members through categorical assessment, monitoring and other professional practices?  
We explore this research question through a multi-sited ethnography, examining gallerist 
gatekeeping practices in New York and London. With roots in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century artistic patronage system, the art market features stewardship and artistic legacy 
expectations, which can be undermined by particular buyers seeking short-term financial gains. 
Through participant observations, interviews, and secondary data, we detail how gallerists made 
nuanced and hidden sorting decisions to distinguish between ‘preferred’ and ‘problematic’ 
buyers. Recategorization was possible later in the relationship, dependent upon behaviors and 
attributes. Our findings show nuanced gatekeeping decisions, especially with the newer investor 
category, recognized by some gallerists, despite longstanding resistance to speculation. 
We offer three contributions. First, certain audience categories can be upheld as ideal, 
helping to channel behavior into desired actions though assessment and discourses, enhancing 
our understanding of category deployment through both categorization and discursive shaping of 
audiences. Second, while gatekeeping research considers initial categorical assessments, we 
advance the literature by examining later monitoring; gatekeepers in custodial roles may not only 
punish included customers for behaviors deemed inappropriate, but might later recategorize and 
blacklist (i.e., exclude) such buyers. Third, and finally, we build a process model of gatekeeping 
over the course of a relationship. Initially, sorting and ‘placement’ occurs with preferred buyer 
categories, new buyers are educated and problem buyers excluded, while monitoring, 
punishment and recategorization is pervasive. Our multifaceted model of category use in 
professional practice deepens understanding of relationships between buyer categories and 
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gatekeeping, particularly for long-term value-construction goals in contexts with quality 
uncertainty and hidden categorization work. 
Gatekeeping and the Categorization of Audiences 
Gatekeepers are often key intermediaries, tasked with making categorical judgments, 
protecting boundaries and enhancing market order. Gatekeepers vary in form and focus, from 
individuals to networks across multiple levels (Peterson, 1997; Franssen & Kuipers, 2013), who 
may focus on particular market areas and strategies (Bystryn, 1989). They work to uphold what 
Zuckerman (1999) referred to as categorical coherence, judging whether individuals, 
organizations, practices, and products belong in given categories (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1997). 
Categories provide cues for gatekeepers’ expert judgment (Rivera, 2015), with categories used to 
determine who: gains admission (Rivera, 2010); is granted permission (Reuber & Morgan-
Thomas, 2017), and; can be trusted (Podolny, 1994). Sorting may involve discretionary devices 
such as blacklists for punishment and discipline (Pontikes, et al., 2010). Penalties can be levied 
when buyers breach market expectations (Ody-Brasier & Vermeulen, 2014), both to inculcate 
positive buyer behavior and punish transgressions (Leyshon & Thrift, 1999).  
We argue gatekeeping also encompasses discursive strategies. For example, gatekeepers 
convey categorical assessments more widely to facilitate exchange, influence perceptions and 
enhance value (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Cattani, et al., 2013; Koçak, et al., 2014; Durand, et 
al., 2017). Such strategies apply to audiences: discourses and stories are important for instilling 
positive buyer behavior, conveying market expectations and deterring unwanted behaviors. 
Categories thus become tools and resources for social actors to elaborate particular social 
identities—for themselves or others—often highlighting differences (Durand & Thornton, 2018). 
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Much existing research focuses on highly visible categories, from environmental ratings 
to rankings (Kovács & Sharkey, 2014; Sharkey & Bromley, 2015), where the visibility of 
categories renders them useful to target audiences (Washington, 2004; Washington & Ventresca, 
2004). Far less is known about hidden categories that typically remain private in their 
deployment and equip gatekeepers with greater levels of discretion. Existing research on private 
categories underscores our incomplete knowledge of private category usage in gatekeeping (e.g. 
Pontikes, et al., 2010; Rivera, 2010). For instance, while discrimination is an illegal form of 
social evaluation, hiring practices behind closed doors nonetheless seek to identify unacceptable 
candidates to exclude, as well as highly valued candidates to prioritize (Rivera, 2015). Privacy in 
sensitive contexts including hiring, prize deliberation and other areas where gatekeepers might 
seek to sensitive sorting decisions that would be ‘fraught with contention’ if performed under 
public scrutiny (Quinn & Munir, 2017: 115).  
Another gap motivating our work relates to the understudied issue of temporality within 
the gatekeeping and categories literature. Lewin’s (1947) classic work suggests that once 
gatekeepers let people, firms, and items pass through the gates, they tend to support those 
included, perhaps with further gatekeeping by actors at higher levels (Franssen & Kuipers, 
2013). For example, universities use categories to evaluate the suitability of proposed student 
organizations during formal approval processes (Coslor, et al., 2018); once approved, student 
clubs face lower administrative scrutiny. We know far less, however, about contexts where 
gatekeepers’ responsibilities continue well past the point of admission, prompting examination of 
whether gatekeepers grant approval differently when considering the long-run implications of 
their sorting decisions. Gatekeeper scrutiny might also differ in contexts where categorical 
approval is enduring (Podolny, 1994; Long Lingo & O'Mahony, 2010), versus contexts featuring 
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regular review, such as firm ratings (Sharkey & Bromley, 2015), or if troublemakers can be 
thrown out (Rivera, 2010). Work on cultural consecration aside (e.g. Allen & Lincoln, 2004; 
Cattani, et al., 2013), the longer-term implications of category inclusion and exclusion have 
received scant attention, particularly when it comes to audiences. This perhaps relates to the 
dearth of studies on categories and gatekeeping that consider moral implications when it comes 
to categorical boundaries in professional practice, which we consider next.  
Categorical Considerations in Gatekeepers’ Professional Practice 
Gatekeepers are often embedded in formal and informal codes of practice, and many 
perform professional gatekeeping roles (Anteby, 2010; Rivera, 2010, 2015; Gustafsson, et al., 
2018), adding additional responsibility. Professionalism includes upholding the integrity of one’s 
office (Abbott, 1988), work historically considered a service to God and humankind (Weber, 
1992). Aspects of professionalism and duty of care thus precede instrumental goals like profits. 
Despite arguments that erosion of ethics has diminished ‘entrance into an office’ (Weber, 1968: 
69) from meaning a ‘vocation’ with a duty of care, echoes of these duties nonetheless remain in 
many professions. 
A professional duty of care has implications for categorical boundaries. Despite positives 
of categorical ambiguity, blending and spanning (Durand & Paolella, 2013; Pontikes & Barnett, 
2015), the benefits of relatively crisp boundaries are revealed by intermediaries enforcing 
authenticity and boundaries of cultural genres (Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005; Jones, et al., 2012), 
and regulators being flummoxed by categorical ambiguity (Funk & Hirschman, 2014). Emergent 
categories in particular create problems for assessing category attributes and membership (Hsu & 
Grodal, 2015), and thus categorical boundaries. Categorical ambiguity in audience categories can 
be particularly problematic when it comes to duty of care. For example, therapists need to 
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transfer clients due to conflict of interest, while animal breeders must exclude buyers suspected 
of animal cruelty. Duty of care assessments also entwine value in various ways, from legal issues 
of value damage to penalties levied for moral breach in markets, or restrictions of the exchange 
value of products (O'Mahoney, et al., 2013; Ody-Brasier & Vermeulen, 2014). This becomes 
significant when professional duty of care seeks to limit harms to both clients and market order. 
For instance, gallerists block customers who might damage artistic careers (Velthuis, 2005), 
exemplifying both moral and instrumental motives. We question what happens to categorical 
boundaries when audience gatekeeping decisions are made not just to avoid lower profits or 
future value, but to prevent harm to organizational reputations, market function, individual 
careers or human dignity. We find inspiration in work where moral judgments are attached to 
categories (Durand & Vergne, 2015; Reuber & Morgan-Thomas, 2017), often via assessment of 
actions and attributes implied by category membership and social performance (Ashforth & 
Humphrey, 1997; Anteby, 2010). Nevertheless, research on gatekeepers’ use of categories to 
perform moral assessments and sort audiences is limited. Overall, whether for instrumental, 
moral or multiple motivations, we view gatekeepers’ concern with the long-term vitality of 
particular products and markets as an exciting context to examine the assessment of audience 
categories and their boundaries. 
Empirical Context: The High-Value Art Market 
We examined gatekeeper assessment of audiences and category boundaries in the high-
value art market. In terms of structure, auctions are public, open to all buyers and sellers, 
comprising the main secondary (resale) market (Velthuis, 2005; Heath, 2013). The gallery 
system, in contrast, hosts the primary market (first-time sales). Characterized by private 
exchanges and long-term patronage, transactions between galleries, collectors, museums and 
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individuals (usually brokered by gallerists) make up 50-60% of the market by sales volume, with 
auctions comprising the remainder (Velthuis, 2005). Buying works from galleries to sell at 
auction—i.e. arbitrage—is a point of contention, especially in the short run. Auction prices 
underlie later valuations, with comparable works by the same or similar artists used to value 
unique items (Karpik, 2010; Coslor, 2016). Auction price instability can cause buyers to lose 
faith in the artistic value of the work (Velthuis, 2005), destabilizing an artwork’s perceived 
significance. That is, price changes are both symbolic and interpretive, with an expectation that 
prices should not decrease (Velthuis, 2003). Meanwhile, art price appreciation encourages 
speculation and financial investment (Campbell, 2008) and an influx of new buyers with 
different motives threatens to destabilize prices further.  
Gallerists use gatekeeping to bring order and stability to the market, given the 
complicated relationship between prices and valuation. In this unregulated market, gallerists both 
create the market for the artists they represent (buying and selling), and intervene to control price 
levels, temper speculation, and link seminal artworks with key tastemakers. A primary objective 
is to ‘establish a firm market for their artists’ as a means to build market stability via ‘control of 
the biography of the work’ (Velthuis, 2005: eg. 6-7).  
Methods 
Our three-year ethnography on art as an investment (Coslor, 2016; Coslor & Spaenjers, 
2016) examined gallerist practices in the high-value international art market, where artworks 
range from several thousand to millions of dollars. Our method ‘followed the object’ of art 
investment (Czarniawska, 2004). We thus focused on gallerist practices in two dominant art 
markets: New York and London. As the leading centers for international art market sales 
(Morgner, 2014) these cities host major art world institutions, while as financial centers, feature 
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prospective investors. Initial exploration of the structure of this market highlighted the global and 
seasonal patterns of major auction sales, art fairs and gallery openings. This event-based context 
suited multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995), a technique with growing popularity in 
organization studies because of its applicability to global markets and processes (Jarzabkowski, 
et al., 2015).  
Data was generated from 34 ethnographic interviews and participant observation at 29 
events, as well as numerous secondary documents (Table 1). Interviews were conducted with 
relevant actors (e.g., art fund representatives, gallerists), both opportunistically and through 
snowball sampling. Interviews at art fairs were especially useful, given our focus on difficult-to-
access elites (Odendahl & Shaw, 2002); galleries selected to show at juried international art fairs 
are deeply embedded in market practices. Interviews lasted between 20 minutes and several 
hours, featuring open-ended questions, with attention to art investment, gallerists’ professional 
practices, perceptions of bad behavior, and refusals to sell to art investors. Participant 
observation at art events (auctions, panels, art fairs) traced art investment and gallerists as 
intermediaries, with art market panels noting professional concerns (e.g. ‘Is the Killer Art Market 
Killing Art?’). Secondary sources included art market books (e.g. Lindemann, 2006) and 25 
student Master of Art Business theses from Sotheby’s Institute of Art, selected from a database 
search of ‘art investment;’ these included further interview data. Additional documents from 
events (auction catalogs, guides, flyers), newspapers and secondary sources enhanced 
examination of emergent topics, along with video transcripts of Art Dealers Association of 
America (ADAA) panels. 
***INSERT TABLE 1 HERE*** 
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From the beginning, the research included a focus on gallerists’ gatekeeping practices, in 
part because in contrast to the measured responses typical of many professionals, gallerists’ 
stock-in-trade storytelling revealed views on the most admirable—and despised—buyer 
practices. Gallerists not only oversee who is enrolled into buyer categories, but also socialize 
new collectors into preferred categories. Some buyer categories and behaviors were upheld as 
valorous, with others deemed worthy of punishment and exclusion. Practices in New York and 
London were generally consistent, in part because high-value gallerists—and some collectors—
attend art fairs, auctions and events worldwide.  
Qualitative analysis 
Our analysis built on cultural anthropology methods. We used interpretive thematic 
analysis (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Delmestri & Greenwood, 2016), synthesizing thick description 
into interrelated themes to identify patterns and commonalities. With an emphasis on shared 
beliefs, practices, customs and meanings, primary interviews with gallerists and relevant actors, 
along with interviews in secondary data, were analyzed to determine motivations and strategies 
for gatekeeping. Working iteratively between these data and our growing understanding, memos 
and diagrams helped crystallize coding. Successive review of key themes and data revealed key 
discourses related to art buyer categories, categorical pairings and groupings, category-tied 
actions and natural opposites. For example, gallerists often mentioned collectors in comparison 
to investors, while desired behaviors were typically contrasted with problematic behaviors. 
An initial goal was understanding why some art investors were allowed to buy—
sometimes welcomed—despite the general mistrust of financial motives by gallerists (see 
Velthuis, 2005). This led us to focus on the in vivo buyer categories, emerging from 
interviewees’ own descriptions, allowing identification of preferred (‘collectors,’ ‘investors’) 
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and problematic (‘speculators,’ ‘flippers’) buyer categories. Buyers categorized as preferred 
acted in ways judged appropriate by gallerists, while problematic buyer categorization indicated 
behaviors damaging to artistic careers. We focused on: refusal to sell (e.g. selective sales, trust, 
‘placement’); behaviors and attributes of collectors; behaviors and attributes of investors, 
particularly as distinguished from problem buyers; discursive category use and buyer 
socialization, and; strategies to deal with problem buyers. We systematically applied buyer 
categories across the data, a task requiring nuanced ethnographic interpretation. Idiosyncratic 
language use meant we had to review the context to understand correct meanings, going beyond 
keywords as a dealer might say ‘speculator’ to mean a legitimate buyer. This was especially 
significant because the investor category was in formation and not universally recognized; some 
gallerists lumped investors and speculators together as buyers to be avoided, meaning analysis 
required care to assemble the attributes constituting the legitimate investor, as opposed to 
undesirable speculators. We then focused on how buyer categories and gallerist gatekeeping 
practices related to one another. For example, a ‘flipper’ could be categorized as a type of 
speculator, leading to a gatekeeping strategy of blocking.  
Through iterative refinement of these themes (e.g. Corley & Gioia, 2004), we 
systematically recoded buyer attributes and behaviors, particularly those considered preferable or 
problematic by market participants, then assembled these into buyer categories, and finally 
preferred versus problematic buyer types (Figure 1), which linked to particular gatekeeping 
strategies. Buyer categories and gatekeeping strategies were well-documented across multiple 
sources (e.g. Table 2).  
***INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE*** 
***INSERT TABLE 2 HERE*** 
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Findings 
I Preferred buyers: Patrons, traditional collectors and strategic placement 
The art world is built on a network of personal relationships that develop over time. 
A gallery is judged on its track record. Over and over again, the associations 
between dealers and collectors have had a vital impact on the making of art history.  
(Adam Sheffer, Cheim & Read, quoted in ADAA, 2007: 18) 
The ideal client for a gallery was someone who would contribute to an artist’s career. Rooted in 
the historical patronage system and patron-artist honor, this provided an ideal-type for 
appropriate behavior. ‘Their responsibility is first and foremost towards the artist. A good 
collector, like a good gallerist, tries to carefully promote an artist, take care of him (sic) and 
follow his career, and also to share his collection with the public’ (art advisor, London, quoted in 
Baker thesis, 2007). Obligations towards artists and the public were shared by collectors: ‘You 
want to be a good steward,’ (Dallas collector Marguerite Hoffman, ADAA panel, Intimate 
Histories of Collecting).  
Gallerists were thus concerned with ‘placement’ of work with established collections and 
collectors who would become stewards: 
We hope that artists will get the best museums, biennials, the best art reviews, and 
the other steps that are required for them to achieve renown. In order to help this 
process, we must of course try to place their works in the collections of great 
museums, but also with certain private clients whose personal collections are well 
known and respected (gallerist Emmanuel Perrotin, quoted in Lindemann, 2006: 
104). 
Given the markers of artistic success, Perrotin identifies the ideal of respected collectors 
becoming recognized tastemakers, highlighting the aspirational and socializing use of the 
collector category, where the best collectors might take a consecrating role.  
These attributes and behaviors provided a basis for forward-looking, value-enhancing 
gatekeeping, as stewardship was related to the current and future value of artwork (Robertson, 
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2005). Museums were valued, important for artistic consecration, but placing works with private 
collectors could be preferable at early career stages:  
You think about the artists and what that will bring to them. Collections where they 
will make an impact. Put things into museums but [a] young artist’s work enters 
the collection and suddenly the museum treats it like a rare Rembrandt painting and 
put[s] a moratorium on travel and then you can’t borrow the painting because of 
factors determining or some space is shown to not have a high enough humidity 
level… [C]ollectors… They tend to get behind artists. They want to develop and 
help artists… (Gordon VeneKlasen, Director of the Michael Werner Gallery, 
ADAA panel ‘Is the Killer Art Market Killing Art?’). 
A hallmark of preferred collectors was an absence of monetary focus, as least in theory, echoing 
an ideal that art is incommensurable with money (Velthuis, 2005). Much has been written about 
this type of collector, particularly in sociology (Becker, 1982; Velthuis, 2005). More revealing is 
to turn to other art buyers, particularly those with financial motives. 
II Problem buyers: Speculators, flippers and dumpers 
We next turn to problem buyers, particularly ‘speculators’ interested in using art for 
financial gain, and concerns that art would be ‘hidden’ away in storage (e.g. Sokolowski 
interview). Gallerists especially worried about arbitrage—buying artworks from galleries to sell 
at auction—which risked auction prices falling short of estimates, with negative impacts for the 
artwork and artist (Velthuis, 2003). The visibility of online auction prices increased concerns, 
particularly when pieces failed at auction and were publicly designated as ‘bought in’ (Coslor, 
2016). 
These risks were higher for newer works and less-established artists. One gallerist 
representing well-established artists rarely encountered this behavior, which was less of a 
problem if people sold at auction in 10 years, rather than three, allowing the work’s value to 
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become established (London gallerist interview, Frieze Art Fair). Other gallerists seemed 
relatively unconcerned about arbitrage between gallery and auction:  
That’s not so much a problem for us, because we typically split the sales price with 
the artist, but that has happened. If we find out about it, we might try to work out a 
better deal for the artist next time, or see if there’s someone else who might be a 
better fit (gallerist interview, New York Armory Show). 
Despite the relaxed attitude, we find a subtle gatekeeping strategy. The next time this buyer 
sought to purchase, the gallery might recommend different artists. 
Even worse than selling at auction without gallery consent were buyers who might try to 
‘flip’ artworks, analogous to the practice of buying and quickly reselling houses for real estate 
investment. According to one gallerist, flippers: 
… buy something and automatically try to resell it. And they don’t understand that 
every gallery has the same price. You’re not going to buy it from me and then turn 
around and sell it to a gallery with the same artist and make money, so they get 
nervous because they don’t realize that, and then they put it on the secondary market 
[at auction], and then we have to go in and buy it back (Washington DC gallerist 
interview). 
Flippers were a subtype of speculator, judged negatively because they risked destabilizing price 
levels while creating additional work and expense for gallerists. But the most problematic 
category was that of ‘dumpers,’ those who sold multiple works with no regard for the artist’s 
career. Dumping flooded the market: multiple artworks by the same artist in circulation could 
decrease prices. In the case of major collectors dumping was the opposite of consecration, 
seriously damaging artistic careers. Consider the case of artist Sandro Chia: a serious breach of 
expected behavior occurred when collector Charles Saatchi ‘disposed of all six of the paintings 
that he purchased. Saatchi gave the impression that he sold the works to “purge” the collection 
rather than to obtain money. Chia [had] proposed to buy back the paintings rather than permitting 
Saatchi to sell them to just anyone’ (Urban thesis, 2003: 32). But Chia’s request was refused. 
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Speculators, flippers and dumpers were identified as buyer categories to be avoided. 
Avoiding buyer ambiguity due to duty of care concerns about artistic careers, as valuing 
aesthetics over profits, explain a frequent sense of resistance to financial investment in the art 
market. Surprisingly, some investors were deemed acceptable by many gallerists, despite 
frequent suspicion of buyers with financial motives. 
III Emergent category: Investors 
Placement concerns and valuation impacts of visible auction prices help explain why art 
dealers historically discouraged investment activity, making ‘a sharp distinction between ‘right’ 
and ‘wrong’ acquisition motives’ (Velthuis, 2005: 6), privileging aesthetic motives. Yet our 
findings indicated gallerists were not necessarily against buyers profiting from the artwork, 
instead maintaining strong views about acceptable ways to profit. Placing work into museums or 
prized collections to consecrate an artist’s career was the top goal. But even if buyers later sold 
the work, rather than donating it, buyers could earn acceptable monetary rewards through a 
steady increase in the value of an artist’s work over time, particularly with stewardship practices 
to help build up this value.  
These allowable ways to profit help to explain why some gallerists recognized an 
investor category, distinct from problematic speculators. This was most clearly shown in Loring 
Randolph’s (2005) Sotheby’s thesis, which noted financial motivation for collectors, investors 
and speculators, but distinguished investment as seeking long-term gains and potentially 
including aesthetic judgments. In contrast, speculating was ‘buying art in the hopes of gaining a 
return, not from the non-pecuniary benefits of owning art – but a monetary and gambling or risk 
satisfaction, in a short-term period… Speculation described in this manner threatens the stability 
of the art market’ (37). Through a long-term view and ‘formation of judgments’ (37), Randolph’s 
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definitions suggested investment could be separated from disruptive speculation, and potentially 
acceptable. This emergent category of pure investors, including individuals, syndicates and large, 
professional organizations (Coslor & Spaenjers, 2016), was grounded in academic research on 
diversification, with art as a portfolio hedge (Campbell, 2008), given long-term investment 
properties (Robertson, 2005). Investors could also have mixed motives: as explained by one art 
fund representative, about 40% of their clients were also interested in the art, whereas ‘all are 
interested in the money’ (art fund interview, London). 
Nonetheless, some gallerists steadfastly rejected all art investors: ‘We don’t solicit 
them—it automatically leads to bad behavior. If I know you’re going to take the piece to auction 
in a couple of years, why would I sell that to you?’ (London gallerist, Frieze Art Fair, London). 
A more common, moderate view was skepticism that art investment would make money. Andras 
Szanto of Sotheby’s Institute of Art raised market volatility concerns: ‘We’ve seen this type of 
interest before, but then there’s a crash and they disappear’ (interview). A few gallerists 
welcomed investors, particularly in interviews conducted soon after the financial crisis, such as 
this one in early 2009:  
Oh yeah. There was an article in the Wall Street Journal ... about art as an 
investment and they had an interview with our founder. But there are many different 
kinds of collectors. For those that do want to make money on art, we like to say that 
now is the best time to invest in art… because you can get a discount on the price 
(gallerist interview, New York Armory Show). 
In actively supporting art investment, this gallerist categorized investors as a sub-type of 
collector—a less common view—but one showing the category’s movement away from 
problematic speculators.  
While this warm reception for investors was not typical, there was reasoned acceptance 
of investors by many gallerists. Investors were less preferred than collectors, but unlike problem 
buyers, were presumed to be businesslike by gallerists who recognized this distinction. As 
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pointed out by a New York gallerist—one with moderate views on investment—while it was not 
the gallery’s focus, ‘[t]here are people out there who buy for investments, but they treat it like a 
business, not to live with [artworks]’ (New York gallerist, International Fine Art Fair, New 
York). Several interviewees also differentiated art funds as especially unproblematic:  
…I don’t think anyone has a problem with the [funds]. [It’s investors] putting 
money into a common [pool]. The people who are investing in the [funds] don’t 
have time to do a hands-on speculative hobby, which a lot of finance guys are doing 
– it’s a hobby for them. They thought it was cool … [Whereas] no one has problems 
with the [funds]. That is just people putting their money in and having specialists 
buy the work (Washington DC gallerist).  
This quote highlights the advantage of ethnographic research in picking up nuanced 
understandings. We see this gallerist’s view that speculators were tolerated whereas art funds 
were completely acceptable. Additional examination highlighted how art experts working for art 
investment funds often had the same or similar education and experience as gallerists, with 
training in prestigious institutes like the Courtauld Institute of Art. As knowledgeable art market 
insiders, these experts were trusted to act in ways ensuring future value. 
The comments of investors themselves also illuminated shared understandings of what 
constituted an art investor. This was an active process, with efforts to ‘fit’ into this market and 
gain acceptance, and not ‘try to manipulate the market’ (art fund interview, London). Investors 
might also circulate the work in the same way as collectors, as seen in the British Rail Pension 
Fund’s investment in art in the 1970s and 1980s. Susan Adeane, formerly Group Company 
Secretary for the Railways Pension Trustee Company (RPTC), played a role in the British Rail 
Pension Fund’s investment in art and collectibles. She noted the importance of loaning out 
artworks: ‘that was partly commercial, and it was also [that] we deliberately targeted some of the 
national institutions and some of the galleries in smaller towns which have big railway 
connections. So York City Art Gallery, and Doncaster Museum’ (interview). As one of the four 
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directors of the group making decisions about the art collection in the last 10 years of its 
existence, Adeane suggested that if British Rail was an investor, it was also a patron, treating 
artwork as a resource to be shared with the public.  
Investors also played a useful role with what we term ‘shadow placement.’ Echoing the 
strategic role of ‘placement’ with prominent collectors helping to add value, investors provided 
gallerists and collectors with a convenient way of privately selling off artwork. This was 
preferable to auctions at times when prices might fall short of estimates, creating a negative 
signal about an artist (art market advisor, gallerist comments). Moreover, high profile art 
collectors might prefer to ‘conceal their errors to protect their reputation’ (Robertson, 2005: 15). 
Investors could thus be integrated into gallery business models as another type of buyer, 
stimulating purchases and potentially injecting ‘liquidity’ into the market (art market advisor, 
London; Tokyo gallerist, Frieze Art Fair, London). 
For gallerists who recognized a distinction between speculators and investors, investors 
seemed to play a useful market role. Investors displayed stewardship behaviors like collectors, 
helping to develop monetary value. They worked with gallerists: loaning out work, promoting 
artists, actions that could help to increase the perceived art-historical (and monetary) value. 
When it came time to sell, preferred investors worked together with gallerists, to mutual benefit. 
The investor category was newer than traditional collectors’ roots in the artistic patronage 
system, but unlike profiteering speculators, shared obligations and knowledge about the art 
market, perhaps building artistic recognition that could translate into monetary value. Buyers 
from art investment funds in particular seemed to fit existing market needs, with professional 
practices and matching temporal goals, plus the ability to quietly help dispose of collections. But 
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if gallerists preferred certain categories of buyers, we must examine additional gatekeeping 
strategies. 
IV Controlled allocation and strategic placement 
You can’t walk into Victoria Miro, [a prestigious contemporary gallery in London] 
and go, ‘I’d like [to buy] this.’ …they’ll say, ‘Well, first of all, we’ve sold out this 
show a month before we put it up. Second of all, there’s a two-year waiting list for 
this artist’s work. And third of all, who are you? Can we have your name?’ (artist 
Henrik Potter, also manager of the Free Art Fair, London). 
Bringing in new buyers was a risk for gallerists. Assessing the type of buyer required guesswork: 
would they become a desirable tastemaker or a destabilizing speculator? Unlike strategic 
placement with recognized collectors, assessment was also difficult because new buyers often 
lacked knowledge of art market rules, meaning they could unintentionally exhibit problematic 
behavior. For example, buyers were generally expected to give the original gallery ‘rights of first 
refusal’ should they want to resell the work, because as market makers, gallerists knew potential 
buyers. Even for auction sales, gallerists wanted a chance to inform collectors of the artist to help 
ensure a reasonable hammer price; private sales were preferable where there was a risk that 
auction prices could fall short of estimates. Hence, the initial gatekeeping task of a gallerist was 
to decide whether they actually wanted to sell to a new buyer, given the risk of a buyer not 
becoming a solid collector, well versed in art world expectations, but a problematic speculator. 
Gallerists were able to make this initial, sensitive categorical assessment that would 
determine if buyers were ‘in’ or ‘out’ (Lewin, 1947) because they are not obligated to tell 
prospective buyers what they have for sale, nor are they obliged to sell; the art market is 
unregulated. An unknown buyer could offer a prominent gallery several times the price of a 
painting, and the gallerist might not only refuse to sell, but also take offense, given existing 
waiting lists for artworks and a preference for buyers who will appreciate and hold the artwork 
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(summarized from comments by Roland Augustine, director of the Luhring Augustine Gallery, 
ADAA panel ‘Intimate Histories of Collecting’; echoed by other gallerists).  
Controlled allocation practices facilitated artistic value construction, with a preference for 
strategic placement with recognized collectors and tastemakers as the preferred buyer category. 
With historical precedent for gallerist gatekeeping going back at least as far as the Impressionist 
Salon period (interview with art professor Elaine A. King), placement was seen by dealers as fair 
and necessary: 
People laugh at this whole notion of us saying that we ‘place’ work instead of 
selling it … But in fact that’s what we try to do. We want the work to go to people 
who are as serious about the work as we are. And that job is probably only going 
to become more difficult (New York gallerist Jeffrey Dietch, quoted in Kennedy, 
2010). 
Even with known collectors, various considerations mattered in allocating artworks, as noted by 
contemporary gallerist Marianne Boesky: 
Let's say in the next Barnaby Furnas show we have six paintings available, and we 
have sixty people who want them—anyone who is willing to donate to a museum 
that wants the work will get priority. …After that's done, then we’ll go back to 
people who’ve been waiting for a long time and who have been especially 
supportive of the gallery over time (quoted in Lindemann, 2006: 35).  
Here was an active prioritization of long-term stewardship to decide who would be allocated artwork by 
prominent artists. Eventual museum donations were prioritized, along with fairness in honoring waiting 
lists and longstanding gallery supporters. Sorting was particularly difficult in boom times, when 
gallerists wanted to select the best collectors:  
Most dealers I know well struggle all the time with having an exhibition of an artist 
having eight works to sell and having 50 people who want to buy it, and have 35 
people who are established, credible, thoughtful collectors… And a good dealer is 
someone whose principal commitment, regardless of how much money is out there, 
whose commitment is to the artist… to develop a healthy and sustainable career. 
So where to place it, how to make it move into the world, how to keep happy those 
people who were dissatisfied but were equally worthy… These pressures are not 
pleasures (Allan Schwartzman, art advisor and panel moderator, New York, ADAA 
‘killer art’ panel). 
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Placement concerns sometimes came from artists: 
… I sometimes go in and say, like, ‘Please sell this to a museum, because this is 
my favorite painting and I feel this would–’ [or] …on the last show [I said] ‘This 
painting I’m even reluctant to sell it to anyone, because I love it so much. I want it 
to go to a place that’s a museum… please try to put– get it there.’ (artist Amy 
Sillman, ADAA Collector’s Forum: Artists and Dealers: Creative Partnerships).  
Another pattern of controlled allocation saw dealers buying their own artists’ work at 
auction, to reallocate to preferred collectors (or sometimes investors). For example, bad behavior 
by an artist might require ‘buying back’ the work:  
…we did have a case of one artist putting her work at auction without our 
permission. Which was just silly, because I found out about it, bought the piece and 
then sold it to a museum for two times what I bought it for, and she would have 
gotten more money if she’d brought it to me (gallerist, New York Armory show).  
Buying back artworks by their artists at auction was a way to stabilize prices and recapture 
control of the artwork, but gallerists disliked having to do this. It might send a bad signal and 
was expensive, especially for works by popular living artists selling for millions of dollars. This 
might maintain prices by limiting supply, as one London gallerist noted: ‘[y]ou also get dealers 
buying for their clients at auction and dealers buying works of their artists back to keep prices 
up. We don’t do that though’ (quoted in Randolph, 2005). Although buying back work was a 
common practice, it was considered by some dealers to be underhanded, or an indicator that an 
artist’s prices were too volatile, perhaps explaining why the gallerist distanced herself from this 
practice. 
Many people disliked the secrecy of controlled allocation, including some from the art 
world. ‘The stock market is much more democratic … No one knows who’s buying. All they 
want is my money … [In the art market] there are certain works you can’t have. There’s this 
underbelly’ (Elaine A. King interview). Tom Sokolowski, then director of the Warhol Museum, 
and previously a curator for the Grey Art Gallery at New York University, was also critical of 
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gallerists falsely indicating that an exhibition was sold out, a common gatekeeping strategy. 
However, he also recognized positive reasons for controlling who was able to buy the work: 
‘Well, some [gallerists] are reputable, they want it to be going to people who they know are 
sensitive [to the careers of artists], who aren’t going to dump something, [and] who do ultimately 
give the work to museums.’ Gallerists working seriously for their artists wanted to ensure the 
buyer would be a long-term collector—not someone who recently came into money and might 
end up ‘dumping’ the work through poorly timed sales, or perhaps literally throwing away 
unsold artworks. ‘And you know, that sort of thing has happened, certainly’ (Sokolowski 
interview).  
Controlled allocation encompassed several distinct gatekeeping practices (placement, 
allocation to good collectors, waiting lists, refusal to sell, buying back). With new buyers, 
gallerists worked to avoid buyers in the problematic speculator category by looking for the 
connoisseurship and aesthetic sense expected of collectors. Controlled allocation was not 
universally appreciated, but seen by gallerists as fair and necessary: fair in that placement 
enhanced artistic careers through recognition and consecration, and; necessary to rule out 
speculators, who might lower auction prices or create volatility, with knock-on valuation impacts 
for the artist.  
V Strategies to socialize new buyers 
As noted, new buyers were risky. Expectations about artistic stewardship surprised 
buyers expecting first-come, first-served exchange, and regulated financial markets. The art 
world was also growing, exacerbating this problem: ‘In the last 40 years the art world has gotten 
something like 100 times bigger than it was’ (Amanda Sharp, Co-Director of the Frieze Art Fair, 
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London, ADAA ‘killer art’ panel). As an unknown quantity, new buyers might turn out to be 
stewards of artistic careers or problematic speculators, perhaps without realizing it.  
Expectations of buyers were not always obvious, meaning socializing new entrants into 
the expected duties of collectors (or investors) was required. Gallerists relied on formal and 
informal strategies to convey and enforce the expectation that buyers were entrusted with the 
artwork and, as such, had certain obligations. These expectations were sometimes made explicit, 
for example through agreements that buyers return work to the original gallery should they wish 
to resell. But gallerists often preferred socialization strategies, conveying norms of good 
collectors (and investors) through relationships:  
Well, we don’t evoke the ‘right’ of first refusal, because it’s not a ‘right.’ Our clients 
choose to come back to us to sell a piece because we have developed a positive 
relationship with them. You want to place the works with good people and 
collections which will better serve the interests of your artists. We have strong 
relationships with people and ultimately as a financial concern, if they wish to re-
sell a piece they recognize they will have a better chance of doing so through us. 
These things are based on trust (London gallerist, quoted in Randolph, 2005: 
Gallery selling artworks priced from several thousand to millions of pounds).  
This gallerist’s emphasis on trust indicates limits on what a client might do with the artwork. 
Trust seemed to be the crucial element, as in another gallerist’s comments about rights of first 
refusal: ‘No, that is something that is impossible to enforce. We want our clients to trust us 
because we trust them’ (London gallerist, quoted in Randolph, 2005). A gallerist’s goal was a 
long-term, trusting client relationship: ‘We always try to be helpful. What we ideally want is a 
30-year ongoing relationship with clients’ (London gallerist interview, Frieze Art Fair, London). 
Not only were gallerists categorizing buyers for inclusion or exclusion, they might need 
to shepherd buyers toward preferred behaviors (i.e., ‘educating’ buyers). This was a sales tactic, 
but also a careful socialization process, seeking to inform new buyers of expected behaviors and 
discourage disruptive speculation. Shaping people to fit desired buyer categories was 
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exemplified in galleries helping collectors build collections over time. These techniques could be 
used with both collectors and investors. But given the potential risk of speculation for those with 
financial investment motives, additional techniques might be required, including disciplinary 
strategies. 
VI Gallery discipline strategies for problem buyers 
Controlled allocation of artwork to trusted buyers helped gallerists to avoid problems, but 
bad behavior persisted, perhaps from miscategorized speculators or collectors’ financial 
problems motivating sales. Problem buyers engendered various responses by gallerists, of which 
three were particularly important. First, gallerists practiced active sorting of even trusted 
collectors, often via the waiting list, as seen in the ADAA guide for collectors: ‘Dealers 
appreciate clients who turn to them when re-selling, and are more likely to offer these collectors 
important works in the future’ (ADAA, 2007: 20). Sorting was based on desired behavior, such 
as philanthropy: 
Museums and non-profit spaces commonly request curatorial advice from dealers 
and ask for help in locating works the institutions wish to borrow for exhibition… 
Collectors who understand the custodial relationships inherent in caring for and 
lending their art to important exhibitions will often be treated more favorably by 
the dealer and the artist (ADAA, 2007: 19). 
Second, bad behavior might require buyer recategorization. This could be due to initial 
miscategorization or collector hardship: ‘In the good times, you can control the market. In the 
bad times, some people become desperate, and then they’ll sell things they wouldn’t otherwise’ 
(London gallerist, Frieze Art Fair). Third, the ultimate penalty was for the gallery to drop a client 
and blacklist them. When asked ‘[what] if someone buys work from you and sells it at auction 
quickly?’ an interviewee replied, ‘We never sell to them again. And the art world is incestuous, 
we all know each other. It’s a small world’ (London gallerist, Frieze Art Fair, London). Gallery 
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coordination made it possible to exclude buyers from new works by their artists, with 
blacklistings likely to spread in the small world of the art market. We were told about an East 
Coast collector blacklisted by the Gagosian gallery in New York, whose attempt to flip a piece at 
Sotheby’s required Gagosian to buy back the work at auction.  
Discussion 
Categories are central to how audiences understand organizations (Pontikes & Barnett, 
2015). We find gatekeepers also rely on categories to understand and sort audience members, 
using multiple strategies to produce long-term value and duty of care towards their artists. Due to 
gallerists’ capacity to exclude through sorting, both preferred and problematic audience 
categories featured prominently. This not only adds to organizational studies in creative industry 
contexts (Long Lingo & O'Mahony, 2010; Jones, et al., 2012), and work on careers and 
professionals (Rivera, 2015; Gustafsson, et al., 2018), but advances understanding of the hidden 
life of categories.  
Preferred buyer categories and discourses: Collectors and the emergent investor category 
First, gallerists relied on categories to sort through audiences in pursuit of preferred 
buyers, akin to research on hiring practices (Rivera, 2015). Buyers, however, were not just sold 
artwork, but expected to become stewards. ‘Placing’ artwork with known tastemakers who 
would later donate to museums or help sell artworks avoided the risks of speculation. Incentives 
included benefits accruing from museum consecration, i.e. gatekeepers at higher levels (Allen & 
Lincoln, 2004; Franssen & Kuipers, 2013), and negating problematic price volatility (Podolny & 
Hsu, 2003; Velthuis, 2003). Gallerists sought ‘stewards’ who would help develop the work 
through ‘custodial’ relationships, prominent collections and eventual donations to museums. 
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Priority was granted to known buyers who could be trusted, especially for key artworks and 
emerging artists. Collector and investor categories, in particular, exemplified the long-term 
stewardship expectations of the artistic patronage system and related categorical attributes of 
esteemed buyers. We find that gatekeeping includes long-term temporal considerations, 
highlighting how sorting decisions go well beyond the entry hurdle. Gatekeepers consistently 
examine whether audience members can be trusted and anticipate their future behavior and likely 
impacts on careers and reputations. 
However, emergent categories are difficult for intermediaries to assess (Hsu & Grodal, 
2015), as seen with investors. Collectors and investors differed in their goals, underscoring how 
different forms of value pertain to different audiences (Durand & Thornton, 2018). The collector 
category was rooted in historical expectations of connoisseurship, taste, and procedural issues 
(e.g., loaning out work). The investor category, however, carried art market idiosyncrasies and 
financial market expectations, showing the development of shared meaning in the category 
(Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Koçak, et al., 2014). Echoing the stewardship duties of collectors, 
this new category built acceptance through recognized practices (Segal & Lehrer, 2012). Being 
emergent, the investor category was not universally recognized, but carried behavioral 
expectations about working with gallerists in predictable, businesslike ways. This included the 
ability to buy collections quickly and privately (‘shadow placements’). It is also likely the 
financial crisis had prompted pragmatic reassessment of investors, as in research where market 
logics gain acceptance through shifting external contexts (Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005). 
Additionally, both collectors and investors showed a longer-term focus, highlighting another 
aspect of temporal matching.  
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Buyer categories also helped to socialize and educate new buyers, providing a positive 
template and heroic narrative—or sometimes the opposite—channeling buyers toward preferred 
categories. This follows the generative, identity-formation role of categories in organizations and 
markets at the macro level (Glynn & Navis, 2013; Durand & Thornton, 2018), complementing 
work on discourses of expert categorization and judgment (Bowker & Star, 1999; Glynn & 
Lounsbury, 2005). Discursive deployment of categories illustrated how gatekeepers might 
intentionally refer to preferred buyers, for example, gallerists’ valorization of collectors gaining 
recognition for artistic stewardship. Similarly, some gallerists endorsed investors as appropriate, 
differentiated from problematic ‘speculators,’ using discursive socialization to convey 
expectations about suitable investment practices. Our findings thus contribute to socialization 
and conformity mechanisms via discursively deployed categories. 
Our focus on buyer categories also extends work on categories as reference points for 
judging appropriate client behavior, relating to underlying behaviors and attributes as 
foundations of audience categorization (Anteby, 2010; Reuber & Morgan-Thomas, 2017). This 
underscores the importance of morality in categories research. The ability to assign buyers to 
categories based on professional judgments of expected behavior differs from existing socio-
cognitive sorting research (Pachucki, 2012) due to being paired with a socializing ability to use 
stories about heroes and villains to shape audience category participation (Durand & Thornton, 
2018). These moral attributes of category definitions indicate the presence of a clear normative 
divide between included and excluded buyer categories, contrasting with contexts where 
categorical ambiguity or blurring is beneficial (Durand & Paolella, 2013; Pontikes & Barnett, 
2015). This illustrates how moral considerations play an important role as gatekeepers sort 
through audience members. Nevertheless, though gallerists act in ways deemed morally 
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justifiable for duty of care, this could be interpreted as discriminatory. Future research should 
consider the affordances granted by the hidden life of categories when it comes to inequality.  
Trust but verify: Relational monitoring once past the ‘gate’ 
We also advance categories research exploring how actors combat threats (Anteby, 2010; 
Rivera, 2010; Ody-Brasier & Vermeulen, 2014), first by showing how gatekeepers evaluate the 
fitness of audiences early on, often at the point of entry (Rivera, 2010), and second, by working 
to exclude actors who might represent a risk long before they become manifest: problem 
buyers—especially ‘flippers’ and ‘dumpers’—were excluded before they became a destabilizing 
problem for artworks or artists. Much like the shaping role of intermediaries who enable only 
certain types of commodification and profit (Podolny, 1994; O'Mahoney, et al., 2013), art dealers 
excluded certain forms of monetary gain through categorization work. 
Given the categorical ambiguity of buyers over time, we found sorting assessments were 
made continuously. To discourage problematic buyers, categories became a disciplining device 
(Schneiberg & Berk, 2010), involving initial refusal to sell, and punishments for established 
clients. Gallerists might punish bad behavior even if they stood to profit, with professional 
reputation trumping excessive profit-seeking (Rao, et al., 2001). We thus theorize a continuum 
for later punishments. Smaller issues prompted lighter discipline using sorting and prioritizing: 
buyers might be offered less prominent works or a longer wait for new work. Larger issues 
prompting buyer recategorization allow us to study punitive gatekeeping strategies later in the 
gallerist-buyer relationship. For example, arbitrage behavior saw established collectors 
recategorized as problematic ‘flippers,’ carrying associated penalties. This finding enriches 
understandings of mechanisms to ensure categorical and market compliance (Zuckerman, 1999; 
Durand & Paolella, 2013; Ody-Brasier & Vermeulen, 2014), demonstrating important 
 31 
categorical expectations at later relationship stages, and continuing duty of care (Anteby, 2010; 
Rivera, 2010).  
These discretionary measures enhance understanding of the hidden uses of private 
categories and less visible category uses, contrasting with existing work on the impacts of visible 
categories (Washington & Ventresca, 2004; Kovács & Sharkey, 2014; Sharkey & Bromley, 
2015). We add important nuance to the hidden life of categories, moving beyond binary labels of 
hidden or visible by, instead, capturing the dynamism associated with publicly visible 
categorization work versus decisions that remain hidden. Future research should further examine 
hidden assessments, especially in contexts with ongoing monitoring of both positive and 
negative behaviors. With initial exclusionary gatekeeping—not necessarily visible to potential 
buyers—and later sorting via private waiting lists or blacklists circulated only among gallerists, 
we also show audiences being sorted in different ways at different points throughout 
relationships, which we theorize next. 
A process model of gatekeeping and relational monitoring 
Controlled allocation was motivated by two major forces: building artistic careers and 
concerns about disruptive buyers (Podolny & Hsu, 2003; Karpik, 2010; Coslor, 2016). They 
formed opposite ends of a complex decision hierarchy, extending knowledge of the categorical 
elements of the value-shaping role of gatekeepers. Preferred and problematic categories and 
behaviors provided justification for gatekeeping decisions. Sorting decisions were deemed fair 
and necessary, and the art market’s unregulated status allowed gallerists to privately make 
discretionary categorical assessments about preferred and problematic buyers.  
We theorize an ongoing process of gatekeeping throughout the relationship (Figure 2), 
with initial selection and education, monitoring and later punishments or recategorization. 
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Artistic consecration goals engendered active relationship-building with collectors to enhance 
value, focusing on stewardship, with artworks ‘placed’ with collectors for long-term benefit, 
adding to cultural gatekeepers’ roles as co-producers, tastemakers and selectors (Foster, et al., 
2011). Controlled allocation and socialization of buyers worked well in the initial stages, 
whereas punishments like blacklisting (Pontikes, et al., 2010; Ody-Brasier & Vermeulen, 2014) 
and recategorization typically came later, emphasizing less visible but important gatekeeping 
strategies. Thus, in contrast to classical and recent gatekeeping work (Lewin, 1947; Rivera, 
2010), our general process of audience gatekeeping features pervasive monitoring, allowing 
adjustments and buyer recategorization. This enhances understanding of gatekeeping sub-
processes relating to long-term intermediary-audience relationships, with decisions to exclude 
potential buyers and, conversely, nuanced judgments about which works could be sold to 
‘included’ buyers. Future research could further compare positive and negative sorting practices, 
as our study was more strongly focused on problem behaviors. More specifically, researchers 
might explore permeable categorical boundaries (Durand & Paolella, 2013; Pontikes & Barnett, 
2015), as categorical ambiguity becomes more problematic in situations where categories are 
given moral assessments. 
***INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE*** 
Conclusion 
Our work contributes insightful links between categories and gatekeeping, particularly 
when it comes to the hidden life of categories and their use in sorting audiences. We find that 
professional gatekeeping practices are fundamental for understanding the microfoundations of 
categorization work performed by key intermediaries, with multiple strategies and a temporal 
focus involving duty of care and long-term value. This extends gatekeeping beyond passing 
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muster at the ‘gate,’ examining audience categorization and professional practices by which 
gatekeepers relate behaviors and attributes to category boundaries. Further, the dual role of 
categorizing and discursive storytelling suggests a need for additional work on audience 
categories’ discursive function and the role of heroic and villainous stories in professional 
practice.  
We find that preferred and problematic audience categories feature prominently when 
exploring how gatekeepers rely on categories to understand and sort audience members. First, 
our attention to categorical boundaries enhances our understanding how ambiguity can be more 
or less problematic for different audiences (Pontikes, 2012; Durand & Paolella, 2013). Second, our 
focus on gatekeeper professionalism adds important nuance to research on category uses on the 
micro level. This includes how long-term temporal aspects differ from gatekeeping research 
focused on initial selection criteria (Rivera, 2010; Coslor, et al., 2018). Our findings reinforce the 
importance of initial selection, but also highlight ongoing recategorization and exclusion of 
audience members as critical in the long-term, particularly if it is difficult to recategorize and 
exclude ‘troublemakers’ later (Rivera, 2010). As we focused on gallerists, future research might 
seek to integrate our multi-stage process with gatekeeping by other actors (Franssen & Kuipers, 
2013). Finally, we contribute to a growing body of research that highlights how the 
categorization of buyers for inclusion or exclusion requires gatekeepers to exercise their 
discretion (Podolny, 1994; Velthuis, 2005; Anteby, 2010; Rivera, 2010). Indeed, the hidden 
nature of category use aids decision-making critical for protecting markets and value. We have 
only scratched the surface of the hidden interplay between gatekeepers’ assessments of 
audiences, long-term relational monitoring that underscores duty of care and the 
microfoundations of market intermediation.   
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Table 1: Ethnographic Corpus 
Data type Quantity Original data format 
Primary data   
Interviews 34 
 
Event-based and formal interviews with gallerists, 
artists and those involved in art investment 
Observational data 29 events, including 
auctions, fairs, gallery 
openings, ADAA panels 
and lectures 
Field notes: 4 journals of observational notes and on-
scene memos 
Event-related documents and reports 10 coded 
Over 30 collected 
Auction catalogs, fair guides, company documents, 
reports collected during ethnography 
Surveys of attendees at London Art Fair  50 Paper forms 
Secondary data   
Sotheby’s Institute of Art London MA in 
Art Business dissertations 
24 Included a total of 14 full and 30 partial interviews, 15 
from gallerists. 
Videos 10 ‘America’s Pop Collector,’ BBC features, ADAA 
Panels 
Books 2 Books on art dealers with interview data 
Secondary articles Over 100  Newspapers, magazines and online research 
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Table 2. Coding Examples for Buyer Categories 
Buyer Categories Examples from the Data 
TARGETED BUYERS 
Stewards and Patrons Stewardship of the artwork: At the highest levels, appropriate 
buyers are those that can be trusted to provide safe custodianship 
of the work, thereby maintaining its value and leaving it 
accessible for loaning to exhibitions (McIntyre, 2004: 5). 
 Donating to museums: Say we were both children with trust 
funds. If we go into a gallery, more than likely they won’t sell it 
to you. There’s no prestige, they won’t get anything out of it. 
They might sell it to me because I teach at Carnegie Mellon, and 
hope that I’ll eventually donate it to the Carnegie (Elaine A. 
King interview). 
Traditional Art 
Collectors 
Art over money: The Traditional Collector, a pure aesthete, is 
known for never considering the financial ‘value’ of their works 
or the monetary amount they must part with to obtain the object 
of their desires. For this camp, money is of no consequence 
when the reward reaped from the ownership of a coveted work is 
achieved (Davis thesis, 2005, p. 2-3). 
NORMAL BUYERS 
New Buyers Educating new buyers: …when I was dealing with a lot of the 
finance guys… they definitely put you on speaker phone and 
you’re sitting there with six guys, trying to explain to them the 
difference between [the art market and other markets]. You 
know, why they have to hold on for two years before they donate 
it (Washington DC Gallerist). 
Investors  
(Included by Some 
Gallerists) 
Gallerists open to investors: The art market has long been seen 
as the last unregulated market… The emergence of art as an 
‘asset class’ has become a popular notion... Due to low returns in 
the stock and bond markets investors searched for alternative 
options in investing…financial models and terminology became 
the language of choice when discussing art market returns 
(Collier thesis, 2005). 
Speculators  
(Included by Some 
Gallerists) 
Speculators as normal buyers: I’m happy that [the] price of art 
has risen so enormously? However, it is taking away the 
incentive of art lovers, and giving rise to a breed of speculators 
that are buying art in a manner similar to stocks and shares. 
There is therefore a whole new breed of art buyers with a very 
different motive (gallerist quoted in Juneja thesis 2007). 
PROBLEM BUYERS  
Flippers Avoiding flippers: In the primary market [flipping] is 
something we are very, very careful about. And, if we suspect 
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that to be the case then we really try and hold off from making 
those kinds of sales (ADAA “Committed Vision” Panel). 
Dumpers “Dumping” multiple artworks: If investors dump an artist’s 
work simultaneously, their effect on his/her career could be 
staggering and difficult to recover from (art advisor quoted in 
Gentile thesis, 2007). 
Investors  
(Excluded by Some 
Gallerists) 
Resistance to investors: …gallerists don’t like [investors], 
because what [gallerists] want to do is to get their art in the 
hands of collectors who will enhance the value of their stable of 
artists. They prefer to sell to Charles Saatchi or the Tate Modern 
or whoever, rather to someone’s investment fund, who will lock 
it away where nobody will see it (Eckstein interview).  
Speculators  
(Excluded by Some 
Gallerists) 
Resistance to speculators: Speculation…threatens the stability 
of the art market… In some cases, purchasing art is driven more 
by a desire for ‘risk’ and in others by ‘maximizing utility’ 
(Randolph, 2005). 
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